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Abstract 
Hans Eysenck was a pioneer in many fields of psychological science and is widely 
recognised for his many outstanding achievements. One field, however, in which Eysenck 
contributed the important initial flagstones, although remains largely forgotten, is that of 
socio-political genetics. In this essay I outline Eysenck’s early work (c. 1950s) on the 
structure of political attitudes, detail how Eysenck used the classical twin design in order to 
examine whether genetic factors contributed to individual differences in social and political 
attitudes, as well as discuss the challenges of publishing such provocative findings amidst a 
1970s scientific culture that tended to favour purely environmental explanations of human 
behaviour. Finally, I provide an overview of the development of the field of socio-political 
genetics over the last 40 years and briefly note some of the challenges that lie ahead for the 
field.    
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Hans Eysenck is rightly celebrated in many fields of psychology – he was a pioneer in 
the use of factor analysis for personality research (Eysenck, 1944), he vigorously challenged 
the clinical efficacy of psychoanalysis (Eysenck, 1952), he advocated for biological studies of 
intelligence (Eysenck, 1986), and he even wrote popular science books on topics as diverse as 
the psychology of sex (Eysenck & Wilson, 1979) and astrology (Eysenck & Nias, 1982). 
However, a field of research that many do not readily associate with Eysenck, although one 
in which he helped to provide the initial flagstones (Eaves & Eysenck, 1974), is that of socio-
political genetics. My goal in this brief essay is to describe this early work, to set it in the 
context of the times, and to reflect on the progress that the field of socio-political genetics has 
made in the subsequent years. 
 
Inevitably Political? 
Eysenck began his professional life as a psychologist amidst turbulent political times. 
Hitler’s Nazi vision had persuaded Eysenck at the tender age of 18 that his future was best 
served outside his homeland of Germany and so it was that he turned to Britain, a country he 
had visited on several occasions and of which he had become fond (Corr, 2016). There can be 
little question that many difficult challenges faced Eysenck in these early years. However, 
these experiences fuelled his desire, as they did for many others at the time (e.g., Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Milgram, 1974), to understand the structure 
and origins of social and political attitudes, themes that he pursued throughout his career. 
Much of Eysenck’s key thinking on this topic is contained in his 1954 book, The 
Psychology of Politics. One cannot do justice to the scope of this book in a brief essay such 
as this, but some key arguments and observations are of special note. Firstly, Eysenck was 
intrigued by the dimensionality of socio-political attitudes: did a single left-right dimension 
with ‘Socialists…to the left of Liberals, Liberals to the left of Conservatives…[and] 
Communists and Fascists, respectively, constituting the extreme left and the extreme right’ 
(Eysenck, 1954, p. 109) best explain the nature of political sentiment? In contrast to this 
formulation, Eysenck noted that Communists and Fascists were often suggested to both 
possess similar psychological characteristics and so perhaps a model placing Communists 
and Fascists together at one end of a continuum and Liberals at the other end better reflected 
reality. Eysenck recognised that both of these models appeared to contain something of value, 
but that clearly neither of the one-dimensional models could adequately accommodate both 
perspectives. And so the early bases of a two-dimensional model were formed. 
Subsequent research using factor analysis provided consistent support for two dissociable 
dimensions. Eysenck labelled these factors Radicalism (vs Conservatism: the R-factor) and 
Tough-mindedness (vs. Tender-mindedness: the T-factor). The R-factor – defined by items 
concerning issues including socialism, capital punishment, and national security – was noted 
to discriminate powerfully between UK Conservative and Labour/Socialist political party 
supporters and so Eysenck interpreted this dimension as a fundamental component of social 
attitudes. The T-factor – defined by items concerning issues including religion/God, 
compassion for the weak and vulnerable, and sex norms – was interpreted less as a 
component of social attitudes per se but instead as a broader construct more akin to a 
personality trait: The T-factor is “essentially…a projection on to the field of social attitudes 
of certain fundamental personality traits, in the sense that a person’s social attitude (Radical, 
Conservative, or intermediate) would seek expression in terms of the fundamental personality 
variables so closely connected with the T-factor” (Eysenck, 1954, p. 266: italics in original). 
Under this model Communists and Fascists were placed at opposite ends of the R-factor, but 
both placed high on the T-factor. Eysenck also observed that the T-factor was positively 
associated with trait extraversion, as well as related constructs such as aggression and 
dominance. This model was provocative in its support for the unpopular notion that specific 
factions of the political Left and Right were psychologically closer than they might otherwise 
have liked to believe and it also provided a strong platform for future research
1
. 
Eysenck, though, was as concerned with the origins of such attitudes as much their 
structure. Unlike many of his contemporaries (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950), however, Eysenck 
was acutely aware that while research showing parent-child correlations for political attitudes 
was consistent with a model of environmental transmission it was also plausible that genetic 
inheritance could explain such links: Eysenck, while clearly cognizant of the fact that the 
critical studies were yet to be performed, notes that ‘we certainly cannot dismiss outright the 
hereditary hypothesis, as is done so frequently by writers of the psychoanalytic school’ 
(Eysenck, 1954, p. 197). 
 
The First Wave of Political Genetics 
So the scene was set for an empirical study of the underlying aetiology of individual 
differences in social and political attitudes. However, all was not so simple: biological 
accounts of social behaviour and attitudes were deeply unfashionable in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Segerstråle, 2000). To understand the animosity that faced researchers who were interested 
in exploring the role that genetics played in the formation of social and political attitudes 
consider the following sentiments from William McGuire, himself one of the leading social 
psychologists of the time (Jost & Banaji, 2008): ‘A man of this writer’s generation considers 
the possibility that there may be a genetic component in attitude determination only with 
trepidation. Any deviation from a radical environmentalism raises the spectre of a laisse-faire 
political program which countenanced the perpetuation of the status quo with all its social 
and economic inequities, and even with the vicious oppression of minorities that has 
eventuated in our time in genocide’ (McGuire, 1968, p. 161, italics in original). In fairness to 
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 Although it is noteworthy that the structure of social attitudes is still disputed (see useful reviews from 
Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). 
McGuire, he was not impressed with the dogmatism of the time: ‘[T]here is wisdom in 
accepting (rather than rejecting) a doubtful causal factor as a working hypothesis, for the 
heuristic reason that it is easier to disprove an incorrect hypothesis that to discover a 
neglected one’ (p. 161). In fact, McGuire noted that rather than genetic influences on attitude 
determination being a doubtful working hypothesis, such a model of social attitudes might 
even be plausible. For example, speaking on the topic of xenophobia he noted that ‘it appears 
possible for specific attitudes of hostility to be transmitted genetically in such a way that 
hostility is directed towards strangers of one’s own species to a greater extent than towards 
familiars of one’s own species’ (p. 163). 
And so it was into this prevailing wind of peer condemnation, but with the hint that 
important discoveries lay ahead, that the first quantitative genetic study of social attitudes 
was published (Eaves & Eysenck, 1974). Although political psychology and behaviour 
genetics had long been of interest to Eysenck, it is of some note that he co-authored this paper 
with a young Lindon Eaves, who is now widely recognised as a pioneer in behavioural and 
psychiatric genetics (Kendler & Neale, 2014; Martin, 2014) and has since published many 
studies on the genetic and environmental influences underpinning social attitudes (e.g. Eaves, 
Hatemi, Prom-Womley & Murrelle, 2008; Eaves et al., 1997). 
The core features of this landmark study were as follows. A classical twin design was 
used with a sample of 708 same-sex adult twin pairs: 451 monozygotic pairs and 257 
dizygotic pairs. The twins completed a battery of questionnaires tapping radicalism, tough-
mindedness, and a measure of ‘emphasis’ (i.e., the tendency to adopt extreme opinions), 
alongside the personality traits extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism. Anyone familiar 
with the ‘three laws’ of behaviour genetics – the first law notes that ‘all human behavioural 
traits are heritable’ (Turkheimer, 2000) – may not be surprised to hear that all of the measures 
under examination showed substantial heritable influences (h
2
 ranged from .35 - .65: these 
values reflect proportion of total phenotypic variance attributable to heritable factors). But 
this was certainly news at the time in part illustrated by the fact that the findings were 
published in the prestigious journal Nature. Moreover, Eaves and Eysenck reported, as 
expected, that the heritable influences on tough-mindedness were correlated with the 
heritable influences on both extraversion and psychoticism: in other, words tough-
mindedness was shown to possess a shared underlying biology with extraversion and 
psychoticism. In contrast, radicalism was unrelated – phenotypically and genetically – to any 
of the personality variables. 
Given the prickly reception that findings from the field of behaviour genetics have often 
experienced over the last 50 years or so it is pleasing to see the careful tone and sophisticated 
interpretation of the findings alongside the clear lack of hyperbole for what was clearly a 
highly provocative set of results. For example Eaves and Eysenck dutifully noted that the 
twins reared-apart design would provide more powerful insights into heritable influences and 
the relative lack of power of their study design (laying the groundwork for future twins 
reared-apart studies: e.g., Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal & Tellegen, 1990). They also 
noted the possible bias engendered by the presence of gene-environment interaction and 
gene-environment correlation. And they made clear of the importance of not generalizing the 
findings beyond the population from which the sample was drawn because, ‘they are almost 
certain to differ with respect to the relative importance of different determinants of variation’ 
(Eaves & Eysenck, 1974, p. 289). 
Despite these cautious interpretations, the heterodox and provocative findings of Eaves 
and Eysenck were bound to lead to criticism. For example, a letter to Nature published 
shortly after the publication of the Eaves and Eysenck article was unequivocally dismissive, 
‘[M]onozygotic twins are more similar than dizygotic twins [with regards to social attitudes]. 
Eaves and Eysenck simply assume this extra similarity is genetic…They have assumed that 
monozygotic twins, who look alike and are regularly confused for each other, receive the 
same treatment as dizygotic twins’; (Schwartz & Schwartz, 1975, p. 429). This attack on the 
validity of the assumption of equal environments has been a longstanding criticism of the 
classical twin design and is certainly prima facie plausible (more on this below). But it is also 
clear from the tone of the commentary that William McGuire’s prophecy of pariah-like status 
indeed followed those who deemed to argue that social attitudes had a genetic component, 
‘The conclusions are unwarranted and misleading. They reflect only the assumptions of the 
authors and assume the very results they are trying to prove’ (p. 429). 
Despite such criticism, given the prominence across the scientific community afforded to 
articles published in Nature – such papers tend to garner a significant number of citations in 
the subsequent years – and given the novel and perspective-shifting nature of Eaves and 
Eysenck’s results, one might have expected a ground-swell of interest to have emerged across 
a range of disciplines. Sadly, this was not to be. In fact, the citation count for the article was 
remarkably low. To date, this landmark article has been cited just 174 times
2
 (see Figure 1 for 
further details), with most of the citations being self-citations or from a small collection of 
individuals professionally close to Eaves and Eysenck
3
. Indeed, what I have termed above as 
the First Wave of Political Genetics might actually be better thought of as a trickle! 
It is, of course, hard to interpret this pattern of citations: the scientific community at large 
may not have had the infrastructure in place to build upon such work (large scale twin 
registries only became a mainstay of psychological research some years later), maybe social 
and behavioural scientists were not regular readers of Nature
4
, or perhaps the results were 
simply too counterintuitive or politically and professionally untenable for researchers to take 
them seriously. 
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 For example, in the first decade since publication 16 of 42 cites were self-citations, with a sizeable proportion 
of the other cites from a relatively small circle of behavioural geneticists, for example, Robert Plomin, John 
Defries, Nancy Pedersen, John Philippe Rushton and David Fulker. 
4
 Tom Bouchard suggested this might serve as a possible explanation. 
 Political Genetics 2.0 
As the powerful insights into the underlying aetiology of individual differences afforded 
by the classical twin design (and other genetically informative study designs) began to filter 
through psychology, a large number of studies began to be published exploring genetic and 
environmental contributions to psychological traits. It took another 11 years, however, before 
another major paper on the genetics of social and political attitudes emerged (Martin et al., 
1986)
5
. Eysenck and Eaves both contributed to this paper (with Nicholas Martin, Eaves’s 
former PhD student, serving as lead author), published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, USA. This article again found heritable effects on radicalism and 
tough-mindedness in a UK sample, as well as extending these results by showing similar 
effects in a large sample of Australian twins who had completed the Wilson-Patterson 
conservatism scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968). Of side interest, the handling editor for this 
article was E.O. Wilson who, much like Eysenck, has suffered from those who were opposed 
to human social behaviour being studied from a biological perspective (e.g. Allen et al., 
1975). 
The citations to this paper were healthy enough with 61 citations over the subsequent 
decade; but again this was not quite yet the landmark moment that one might expect from 
such findings. Nonetheless, the tide appeared to be turning. Indeed, equivalent battles were 
being fought and (to some degree) won by evolutionary psychologists who, while typically 
interested in different sorts of questions to those of behaviour geneticists, were cognizant of 
the broader notion that human social behaviour powerfully reflects our biological inheritance 
(Wilson, 1975; Barkow, Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). And so in the years that followed a 
steady drip of papers in prominent journals emerged from a number of independent groups all 
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 Although of note, Scarr and Weinberg (1981) reported that authoritarianism was more highly correlated 
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emphasising the fact that heritable factors underpinned individual differences in a range of 
social traits such as prosociality (Rushton et al., 1986)
6
, attitudes (Olson, Vernon, Harris & 
Jang, 2001), and religiosity (Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken & Tellegen, 1990).  
 
The Time is Now 
The dam waters finally burst with a 2005 publication in the prestigious American  
Political Science Review by three political scientists: John Alford, Carolyn Funk and John 
Hibbing. As can be seen in Figure 1, the citations to Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) have 
outstripped that of Eaves and Eysenck (1974) and Martin et al. (1986) by quite some margin. 
 
------- Insert Figure 1 here --------- 
 
Indeed, in its first year following publication Alford et al. (2005) received more citations 
per year than Eaves and Eysenck (1974) and Martin et al. (1986). Just a decade on this article 
has received 650 citations
7
. Moreover, this interest in political genetics spread far beyond the 
scientific community: many major news outlets ran stories on these findings and a range of 
scholars in both psychology and political science took up the mantle to develop knowledge in 
this field (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2012a; Ebstein, Israel, Chew, Zhong & Knafo, 2010; Fowler 
& Schreiber, 2008; Hatemi & McDermott, 2012). What is of special interest here is that 
Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s article is essentially very similar in scope to Martin et al. (1986): 
Alford et al. (2005) report on responses to the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale from 
participants in the US-based Virginia 30,000 twin registry, alongside a re-reporting of the 
results from Martin et al. (1986). The article is certainly well-written and informative (in 
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particular, it provides a useful, non-technical introduction to behaviour genetic theory); but 
the secret of this paper’s success seems to have been as much in its timing as in the message. 
 
The Current Lay of the Land 
As most will be aware, psychological science (as well as science more generally) has 
recently experienced a crisis of reproducibility (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). As such, 
it is particularly noteworthy that evidence for heritable effects on social and political attitudes 
has been reported in virtually every study reported
8
. In a range of countries using many 
different samples of twins heritable effects have been noted for social attitudes as varied as 
in-group favouritism (Lewis & Bates, 2010), prejudice ( Lewis, Kandler & Riemann, 2014), 
religiosity (D’Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes & Spilka, 1999), values (Kandler, Gottschling 
& Spinath, 2016), and economic attitudes (Wallace, Cesarini, Lichtenstein & Johannesson, 
2007). Criticism of the classical twin design – such as perceived violations of the equal 
environment assumption – has largely been silenced by the use of complementary methods, 
such as the extended twin design and the adoption design: in both cases, convergent evidence 
of genetic influences on individual differences in socio-political attitudes has been observed 
(e.g., Bouchard et al., 1990; Hatemi et al., 2010; Kandler, Bleidorn,& Riemann, 2012). In 
short, the evidence base in support of a genetic contribution to differences in social and 
political attitudes is perhaps as strong as for any claim in psychological science. 
Eysenck would likely not have rested his interests in the origins of political attitudes with 
such knowledge in the bank. The underlying neural and molecular genetic bases would surely 
have provided new vistas for exploration. These domains are currently hot topics in social 
and political psychology (Jost, Nam & Amodio, 2014; Benjamin et al., 2012a) with a range 
of research programmes beginning to shed light on the underlying neurobiology of social and 
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political attitudes (e.g., Aoki et al., 2014; Amodio, Jost, Master & Yee, 2007; Lewis, Kanai, 
Bates & Rees, 2012; Kanai, Feilden, Firth & Rees, 2010; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts & 
Hamann, 2006; Zamboni et al., 2009). 
Less promising to date has been the search for specific gene variants that contribute to the 
heritable influences on social attitudes, with the relatively small number of reported finding 
largely unreplicated (see Munafo & Flint, 2011, for a relevant review in the domain of 
personality). However, the advent of large-scale molecular genetic consortia (e.g., Benjamin 
et al., 2012b) seeking to accrue adequately powered samples (i.e., N > 100,000) is currently 
the most promising avenue for exploration with this approach starting to bear fruit in the 
fields of cognition (Rietveld et al., 2014) and mental health (Schizophrenia Working Group 
of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014). 
I never had the pleasure of meeting with Hans Eysenck, much less working with him on 
questions of this kind. However, I am sure that he would have absolutely relished the 
challenges that the field currently faces, particularly with the ever increasing emphasis on the 
use of multiple methods and the desire to probe multiple levels of analysis. The contributions 
to the field would surely have been rich in return.  
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